术语“无限博弈”的详细信息
| 数据项 Items | 术语信息 Info. |
|---|---|
| 汉语术语编号 Term No. | 63000293 |
| 所属学科 Subject | 管理学 Management Studies |
| 汉语术语词性 POS | n./v. |
| 汉语术语分词 Segmentation | 无限/博弈/ |
| 汉语术语长度 Length | 2 |
| 关联术语表达 Association | 有限次重复博弈 有限博弈 |
| 搭配信息 Collocation | 无限重复博弈infinitely repeated game |
| 编纂人 Compiler | 陈兴怡 |
| 编纂日期 Date of Compilation | 2015-11-06 00:00:00 |
汉英语境1
英译术语:
infinite game theory
汉语语境:
企业集群共性技术合作创新成功后，群内企业的行动选择有两种：遵守合作契约或采取道德风险行动。通过单阶段与多阶段无限博弈分析，可以得出企业集群上下游企业纵向共性技术合作创新与竞争企业横向共性技术合作创新后道德风险行动的战略均衡。然后，对此两种不同类型的共性技术合作创新后的道德风险防范，通过委托代理理论建立各自的最优惩罚契约模型，并从无惩罚契约和惩罚契约完备两种类型的企业集群共性技术合作创新出发为集群代理机构提供相关管理建议。
英语语境:
With the success of cooperation innovation about generic technology in an enterprise cluster, every enterprise has two options: abiding by a cooperation contract or taking action of moral hazard. By analyzing the single-session and multi-session unlimited game theory, we can get the Nash equilibrium of moral hazard behavior after cooperation innovation about generic technology in the enterprise cluster between competitive enterprises or non-competitive enterprises. Then, for the governance of moral hazard after these two different types of cooperation innovation about generic technology, we can build their own punishment contract models through principal-agent theory and offer relative management suggestions to cluster agents on the basis of two types of cooperation innovation about generic technology in an enterprise cluster of no punishment contract and punishment contract.